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SOLIMAN v. COMMISSIONER: THE LATEST WORD ON THE
HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION
Robin A. Clark

emands of the business world, more often than not,
require that professionals take their work home with
them, both in the evenings and on the weekends.
Additionally, many self-employed individuals, salespersons,
artisans, and musicians find it necessary, convenient, and
economically efficient to work out of their homes. It is not
uncommon for these groups of professionals to set aside
·rooms in their houses, apartments, or condominiums as
"home offices." Some use their home offices just on
occasion to mill through piled-up paperwork or to make
telephone calls. Others, however, conduct their business
affairs regularly and exclusively from their home offices.
As exhibited in § 262 of the Internal Revenue Code
(hereinafter "the Code"), Congress has long been reluctant
to allow deductions for expenses incurred for personal,
living, and family purposes. 1 Under § 162(a), however,
Congress has consistently allowed deductions for "ordinary
and necessary" expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in
carrying on a trade or business. 2 Where the personal and
business spheres merge, such as in the case of the home
office, legislative and judicial reconciliation ofthese competing Code provisions, §§ 262 and I 62(a), pave a treacherous,
yet well-traveled, road. 3
Section 280A,4 enacted through the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 5sets forth the extent to which a taxpayer is allowed to
take a deduction from gross income for expenses incurred for
a home office.
Under the current law, a taxpayer who qualifies for the
home office deduction may deduct a prorated portion of
certain expenses, e.g., real estate taxes, deductible mortgage
interest, utilities and services, casualty losses, rent, insurance, depreciation, security systems, painting, and repairs.6
To calculate the deduction, a qualifying taxpayer must take
the portion of the home used as the "home office" as a
percentage ofthe total square footage ofhis home and use this
percentage to calculate the prorated portion of expenses
deductible under the home office statute. 7 The amount of the
deduction, however, is limited to the excess of the gross
income derived from the home office activity over the sum of
those expenses incurred without regard to the business use of
the home and all other expenses attributable to the business
activity but not attributable to the home business. 8
Congress intended § 280A to provide "defmitive rules to
resolve the conflict that exist[ed] between several recent

D

court decisions and the position of the Internal Revenue
Service as to the correct standard governing the deductibility
ofexpenses attributable to the maintenance ofan office in the
taxpayer's personal residence. ''9 Prior to the enactment of §
280A in 1976, little guidance existed for determining the
appropriateness of a home office deduction. Although § 262
generally disallows deductions for personal, living, and
family expenses,IO the only express statutory restriction on
the deduction is set forth in § 162(a). That provision simply
requires that expenses be "ordinary and necessary" in
carrying on the taxpayer's trade or business to qualify for the
deduction. II
The IRS has attempted to offer some guidance to taxpayers and the courts through the promulgation of Treasury
Regulation § 1.262-1(b)(3) in 1960. In its currentapplication, that regulation states in pertinent part:
If ... [the taxpayer] uses part of the house as his
place of business, such portion of the rent and other
similar expenses as is properly attributable to such
place of business is deductible as a business expense. 12
Under this regulation, in order for a taxpayer to take the
deduction for the expenses incurred in the business use of a
personal residence, the taxpayer must first establish that
such expenses were incurred in carrying on a business or
trade pursuant to the requirement of § 162(a).13 Thus, it
requires a "relatively reasonable connection" between the
activity conducted in the home and the taxpayer's trade or
business. 14 If successful, "the allocable portion of the
expenses attributable to the use of the home as a place of
business [is] allowed as a deduction" to the extent the
expenses were "ordinary and necessary" in carrying on the
taxpayer's trade or business. 15 Priorto 1976, the home office
deduction was taken largely by self-employed individuals,
investors, and other employees who maintained home offices
in connection with their duties as employees. 16
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service were faced
with the task of developing standards and limitations for the
allowance of the home office deduction in light of § 262, §
162(a), and Treasury Regulation § 1.262-1 (b)(3). As a
result, competing views regarding the limitations of the
deduction developed. The Internal Revenue Service took the
position that expenses incurred in relation to an employee's
home office were deductible only when that office was
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required by the employer as a condition of employment and
was regularly used for the performance of the employee's
duties. 17 Certain courts advocated a more liberal stance and
held that expenses were "necessary" within the allowance
provision of § 162(a) when "appropriate and helpful" to the
employee's business. 18
With the liberal disposition of the courts, the more
stringent stance of the IRS, and the basic need to increase
revenue, Congress responded with the Tax Reform Act of
1976. 19 In adopting this Act, Congress soughtto achieve four
goals: (1) tax reform improving the equity ofthe income tax
at all income levels, (2) tax simplification, (3) continued tax
reductions, and (4) overall improvement of the administration of the tax laws. 20 Within the goal of tax reform,
Congress intended to restrict, to some extent, businessrelated individual income tax provisions vis-a-vis a limitation on deductions for use of the home. 21
Through the enactment of § 601 of the Tax Reform Act,
Congress added § 280A to the Code. The IRS advocated the
restriction that a home office must be maintained for the convenience of the employer in
order for an employee to take the deduction.
Congress recognized this restriction and
adopted it in the Act. 22 This was in large part
a response to the more liberal "appropriate
and helpful" standard employed by the courts.
Through § 280A, Congress expressly rejected
the judicially-created "appropriate and helpful" standard. 23 Such a liberal and subjective
standard presented the taxpayer with the opportunity to convert otherwise nondeductible
personal expenses into deductible business
expenses as a result of the business use of his
home even though the taxpayer incurred no
additional expense. 24
In order to provide definitive rules, ease the
administration of the deduction, and prevent the conversion
of personal expenses into business expenses, Congress,
through § 280A, promulgated the general rule that no
deduction would be allowed for the business use ofa personal
residence "unless specifically excepted from this new section and otherwise allowable. ''25 The House Bill proposing
the legislation drew an express distinction between taxpayers
who are employees and those who are not. For a taxpayer
other than an employee, an allocable portion of ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer in
connection with trade or business use of the taxpayer's
dwelling is allowed as a deduction ifused exclusively and on
a regular basis as the taxpayer's (1) principal place of
business or 2) place of business used to meet or deal with
patients, clients, or customers in the normal course of his
trade or business.26

incurred in connection with the performance of services
which are attributable to the business use of the residence
"only if, in addition to satisfying the exclusive use and
regular basis tests, the use is for the convenience of his
employer. If the use is merely appropriate and helpful, no
deduction attributable to such use will be allowable. "27
The Senate concurred as to these first two exceptions and
the incorporation of the distinction between employees and
non-employees.28 The conference agreement followed the
definitive rules of the House Bill "but include[d] the exception under the Senate amendment for a separate structure
exclusively used on a regular basis in connection with the
taxpayer's trade or business.''29
As enacted, the statute clearly sets forth the threshold
qualifying requirements for the deduction, "exclusivity"30
and "on a regular basis. "31 Once these initial requirements
are met, the taxpayer's home office must fall within one of
the three enumerated statutory exceptions: (1) the home
office is the principal place of business for any trade or
business of the taxpayer (the "principal
place of business" exception), (2) the
home office is the place of business which
is used by patients, clients, or customers in
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the
normal course of business (the "meeting
with clients" exception), or (3) the home
office is a separate structure which is not
attached to the dwelling unit but is used in
connection with the taxpayer's trade or
business (the "separate structure" exception).32 Employees must also use the home
office for the convenience ofthe employer. 33
"Convenience of the employer" is interpreted as meaning a condition of employment, regularly used for the performance
of the employee's duties, and not just
ordinary and helpful in performing the duties as an employee. 34
Since the enactment of § 280A in 1976, the Tax Court
and the federal courts of appeal have adjudicated numerous
disputes between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service involving the principal place of business exception. 3s
Beyond the statutory language, Congress failed to provide
any further guidance regarding the scope ofthis exception. 36
Thus, the courts were left with the dubious responsibility of
filling the void. Unfortunately for the taXpayers, the courts
formulated their interpretations purely on guesswork.
In Baie v. Commissioner,37 the Tax Court, noting the
lack of legislative guidance as to the scope of "principal
place of business" in the context of § 280A, arbitrarily
concluded that "what Congress had in mind was the focal
pOint of a taxpayer's activities ... .''38 As a general
proposition, the "focal point" is the place where goods or
services are provided to customers or clients or where
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income is generated. '>39
that indeed this was a rare case where an employee's princiIn Baie, the taxpayer operated a street side hot dog stand. pal place of business was different from his employer's.49
It was such a rare case, indeed, that two years later the
She prepared the majority of the food at home in her kitchen
and maintained business records in a spare bedroom. The Second Circuit reached the same conclusion. In Weissman
Tax Court disallowed the claimed deduction for expenses v. Commissioner, so the Tax Court disallowed a horne office
incurred at home, concluding that the hot dog stand itselfwas deduction claimed by a university professor. The taxpayer
the "focal point" of the taxpayer's activities, i.e. the place argued that his horne office which was used exclusively for
research and writing purposes, duties required of him as a
where her income was generated. 40
After Baie the Tax Court consistently implemented the professor, was maintained for the convenience of the em"focal point" test in determining whether a home office ployer.51 The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer's
constituted the principal place of business. However, on principal place of business was the university and reasoned
appellate review, the federal courts of appeals continually that the focal point ofany educator's business is generally the
questioned the application of the test and on several occa- educational institution. 52 The fact that research and writing
sions reversed the Tax Court's decisions. 41
was an important part ofthe taxpayer's duties as a professor
In Drucker v. Commissioner,42 the Tax Court held that did not operate to shift the focal point to the horne. 53 Unlike
the taxpayer, a violinist employed by the New York Metro- the Second Circuit's decision in Drucker, the Weissman
politan Opera (the "Met"), had his principal place of busi- Court stated that this is not a situation where an employee's
ness or "focal point" of his business activities at the perfor- principal place of business would be different from his
employer's.54
mance hall and not his home studio where he
practiced thirty to thirty-two hours a week. 43
The Second Circuit reversed, focusing on
its holding and rationale in Drucker. It stated
The Tax Court concluded that the number of
the
hours worked at the various locations is a
that instances where "a taxpayer's occupataxpayer's
consideration, but it is not the controlling
. tion involves two very distinct yet related
factor. Other factors include the nature ofthe
activities ... , the focal point approach creates
home office
taxpayer's business, the various activities of
a risk of shifting attention to the place where
mustfall
which it constituted, and the locations where
the dominant portion of his work is accomplished. "55 Therefore, attention should be
those activities were carried OUt. 44 In addiwithin
one
of
tion, because the taxpayer was an employee,
given to ''the nature of [the] business activithe Tax Court examined these factors from
ties,
the attributes of the space in which such
the three
the viewpoint ofthe employer and concluded
activities are conducted, and the practical
enumerated necessity of using a home office to carry out
that the focal point ofthe Met's business was
45
such activities. "56
it's performances at the hall.
statutory
The commissioner argued that the legislaThe Second Circuit disagreed and instead
emphasized ''time'' and "importance" of
tive
history of § 280A reflects a specific intent
exceptions.
that when such expenses are merely approprithe activities performed at home. Great
ate and helpful Congress clearly did not intend
weight was also given to the fact that the
employer did not provide the employee with practice facili- to allow the deduction of such expenses. 57 In rejecting this
ties even though the employee was expected to practice argument, the Second Circuit stated that the legislative intent
individually off the premises. Based on these factors, the "merely reflects [a] general concern that the horne office be
Second Circuit found that the home practice studio was the used exclusively for business purposes, [not casually or
focal point of the taxpayer's employment-related activities, occasionally], and, in the case of an employee, ... for the
and, thus, was the taxpayer's principal place of business convenience of [the] employer."58 The Second Circuit
within § 280A.46
reasoned that because the taxpayer conducted the majority of
his
work at horne, and, more importantly, because the horne
This holding, the court said, did not frustrate the legislative intent of § 280A. Although Congress intended to provide office was essential to the performance of his employmentclearer standards for the deduction and to prevent the conver- related activities, the practical necessity of the home office
sion of personal expenses into business expenses, the court negated any claim that the office was used as a matter of
reasoned that Congress did not direct such changes to a personal convenience. 59
In Meiers v. Commissioner,6O the taxpayers owned and
taxpayer-musician for whom a home practice area was
essential. 47 Furthermore, because the home practice sessions operated a self-service laundromat. They maintained an
were essential to the employee's business activities as a office in a spare bedroom of their residence in which emmusician and were truly for the convenience ofthe employer, ployee work schedules were drafted and bookkeeping was
the home studio was not "purely a matter of personal performed. 61 The Tax Court found that the facts, holding,
convenience, comfort. or economy. "48 The court cautioned and rationale of its earlier decision in Baie controlled and,
24.1 / U. Bait. L.F. - 5

therefore, the focal point of the taxpayers's business was the
place where income was generated and services rendered, i.e.
the laundromat. 62
The Seventh Circuit reversed and again criticized the
application of the focal point test. The test, the court stated,
"places undue emphasis upon the location where goods or
services are provided to customers and income is generated,
not necessarily where work is predominantly performed. "63
Although the court conceded that the focal point test was easy
to apply and relatively objective compared to pre-§ 280A
standards, those benefits were outweighed by the unfairness
of the test and its failure to carry out the "apparent intent"
of Congress. 64 Instead, the court applied other factors, such
as the length of time the taxpayer spends in his home office,
the importance of business functions performed there, the
business necessity of maintaining a home office, and the cost
of establishing the home office. By using this approach, the
court soughtto "carry out the purpose of Congress to prevent
taxpayers from converting non-deductible
personal expenses into deductible business
expenses while ensuring that taxpayers retain their entitlement to deduct necessary
business expenses. "65
In response to this criticism, the Tax
Court took a step back and recognized the
need to re-examine the "focal point" test. In
Pomarantz v. Commissioner,66 the Tax
Court did not attemptto reconcile the federal
courts of appeals decisions since the case
could be disposed of under any standard. 67
In Po marantz, the taxpayer, a physician,
was a sole proprietor who contracted with an
area hospital and provided emergency medical care services thirty-three to thirty-six
hours a week. 68 Under any test, it was clear
that the taxpayer did not conduct acti vities in
his home office of "sufficient importance"
to render it his principal place ofbusiness. 69
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision and
endorsed its rationale. 70 The court pointed out that the
taxpayer consistently spent more time at the hospital since
the essence of his profession was the "hands-on" treatment
ofpatients at the hospital and his income was generated at the
hospital. 7)
In Soliman v. Commissioner,72 the Tax Court "revisited" the focal point test and its own interpretation of § 280A
in light of the federal courts of appeals decisions "for cases
in which administration of the taxpayer's business is essential and the only available office space is the taxpayer's
home. "73 It concluded that, in essence, the focal point test
merges the principal place of business exception with the
meeting of clients exception. 74
In order to resuscitate the exception, the Tax Court
adopted the "facts and circumstances" test. 75 Soliman, a

self-employed anesthesiologist, worked at three Washington, D.C. area hospitals. Because none of the hospitals
provided him with an office, he maintained an office at his
home in which he perform~ administrative and organizational activities. After examining all the facts and circumstances, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer the deduction
which under the old "focal point" test would have been
denied. 76 The court explained:
A principal place of business is not necessarily
where goods and services are transferred to clients
or customers but is frequently the administrative
headquarters of a business. Furthermore, where no
other suitable office is provided for essential organizational activities of a business, the fact that goods
and services are delivered elsewhere should not per
se require a conclusion that a home office is other
than the principal place of business. The inquiry is
appropriately into the surrounding facts and circumstances. 77
The Tax Court's "facts and circumstances" test approach was criticized by one
commentator as distorting the plain meaning
of the "principal place of business" into
something more like the "essential place of
business. "78 In addition, through the failure
of the Tax Court to set forth a comparative
analysis of both the time spent at the home
office and the activities performed there as
compared with other business locations, the
Tax Court implied that such other business
activities were irrelevant. 79
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court's decision and endorsed the
"facts and circumstances" test. 80 It noted
the significance of factors such as the essential nature ofthe home office to the taxpayer' s
business, the amount of time the taxpayer
spends there, and the availability of another
location available for the performance ofthe office functions
of the business. 8) The court rejected the commissioner's
argument that this new test renders § 280A meaningless by
creating a new loophole for every taxpayer who works at
home. 82 The court supported its position on the ground that
the Tax Court justifiably relied on Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.280A-2(b)(3).83 Although it recognized that the
regulation is not binding on the Tax Court or itself, the Fourth
Circuit found that the proposed regulation represents the
"spirit" of § 280A by allowing deductions for legitimate
home offices. 84 The court concluded that the facts and
circumstances test merely "replaces the inflexible and potentially unjust 'focal point' test . . . [and] more accurately
reflects the purposes and requirement of § 280A .... ''85
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 86 In
Commissionerv. Soliman,87 the Court expressly rejected the
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Fourth Circuit's facts and circumstances test because it
failed to undertake a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's
various business locations. 88 The Court reached this conclusion relying solely on the "ordinary, everyday sense" of the
word "principal" as itis used in § 280A(c)(l)(A).89 Because
the dictionary meaning of "principal" is "most important,
consequential, or influential," it, therefore, "suggests that
a comparison of locations must be undertaken. '>90 The
Supreme Court made only a brief reference to the legislative
history of § 280A .It referred only to the "apparent purpose
of § 280A, which is to provide a narrower scope for the
deduction .... ''91
Justice Kennedy, the author of the Soliman opinion, set
forth a dual standard comparative analysis for determining
whether a home office is the principal place of business ofthe
taxpayer. The primary factor to consider is the relative
importance of the activities conducted at each business
location, taking into account the nature of the taxpayer's
business and those tasks which generate
income. Furthermore, in determining the
place where the most important functions
are performed, great weight is given to the
point ofdelivery ofgoods and services. 92 If
no business location is deemed "principal"
under the initial inquiry, then the second
factor, the time spent at each business location, "assumes particular significance. ''93
The fact that the taxpayer has no alternative
office space or that the activities performed
afthe home office are essential is irrelevant
to the inquiry. 94
The comparative analysis only answers
the question whether the home office qualifies as the principal place of business of the
taxpayer. It does not define which location
is the principal place of business. 9s Therefore, the Court
cautioned the courts and the commissioner not to strain to
conclude that a home office qualifies simply because no other
location does, for "[t]he taxpayer's house does not become
a principal place of business by default. ''96
Applying these principles to the facts of Soliman, the
Court determined that the home office activities ofthe doctor
were "less importantto the business of the taxpayer than the
tasks he performed at the hospital. ''97 Furthermore, because
the doctor spent only ten to fifteen hours a week at the home
office as compared to the thirty to thirty-five hours a week he
spent at the three hospitals, the time spent at home was not
significant enough to render the home office his principal
place of business. 98 Therefore, in light of all the circumstances, the taxpayer's home office did not qualify as the
principal place of business for purposes of the deduction. 99
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed that
the language ofthe statute requires the comparative analysis
enunciated by Justice Kennedy. If Congress intended a

different result as a matter of tax policy, then Congress
should change the language of the statuteYXl
Justices Thomas and Scalia, although concurring in the
result, cautioned that the Soliman comparison test is too
subjective and would be difficultto apply. They endorsed the
focal point test because it provides a clear and reliable
method for determining the principal place of business ofthe
taxpayer.IOI
Commissioner v. Soliman is the final word on the home
office deduction. The complexity and subjectiveness of the
comparative analysis test set forth in Soliman, however,
frustrates the intent ofCongress to provide "definitive rules"
governing the standards for taking a home office deduction. I02 Justice Stevens, author of the only dissenting opinion, believed that, based on a comparison of the Soliman
opinion and the legislative goals of the statute, the majority
misread the statute and deviated from the congressional
purpose of § 280A I03
Congress sought to increase the objectivity and ease of administration of the home
office deduction with the enactment of §
280AI04 The two prong test set forth in
Soliman, however, requires a unique factual
determination ona case-by-case basis. Such
a test is too subjective and creates uncertainty as to how to apply and weigh these
factors. For example, it is unclear how the
Court would have held if Dr. Soliman had
spent only ten to fifteen hours a week at the
three hospitals but thirty to thirty-five hours
a week in his home office. lOS Justice Thomas
pointed out in his concurrence, "[the Supreme Court] granted certiorari to clarify a
recurring question of tax law that has been
the subject of considerable disagreement.
Unfortunately, the issue is no clearer today than it was before
[the Court] granted certiorari."I06
In addition, the Court failed to give the "principal place
of business" exception any independent significance. By
placing "great weight" on the "point of delivery of goods
and services," the Court created the "focal point" dilemma
recognized by the Tax Court in its Soliman decision. lo7
Furthermore, the home office can be considered the principal
place of business only when those goods and services are
rendered at the home office, thus merging once again the
meeting clients exception and the principal place of business
exception. This surely is contrary to the intent of Congress
to give the "principal place of business" exception independent significance by enacting not two but three exceptions.
Most importantly, Soliman is just bad tax policy. The
decision creates the danger of treating similarly situated
taxpayers differently. For example, assume Taxpayer A and
Taxpayer B are self-employed anesthesiologists who contract their services out to area hospitals. Taxpayer A builds
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a small one-room structure in his large, suburban backyard.
Taxpayer B lives in a three room condominium in the city.
None of the hospitals provides offices for the taxpayers.
Each spends approximately thirty hours a week at the
hospitals and fifteen hours a week at his home offices taking
care of the administration of his business. Taxpayer A takes
the home office deduction falling neatly within the separate
structure exception pursuant to § 280A(c){l)(B). Taxpayer
B, on the other hand, does not take the deduction because of
the Soliman decision. I08
The inherent fallacy of Soliman is evident. In assessing
the availability of the deduction, it is illogical to analyze the
activities which the taxpayer performs at home in relation to
activities performed elsewhere. The taxpayer who can
construct a separate structure gets the deduction ipso facto
regardless of the activities performed in the structure. The
Soliman test thus creates an inequity.
As evidenced by the legislative history of § 280A, Congress clearly intended to curb the abuse of the "appropriate
and helpful" standard by employees. However, Congress
did not intend to unfairly deny a benefit to the self-employed,
which Soliman operates to do. I09 Furthermore, the facts of
Soliman dealt with a self-employed taxpayer for whom no
alternative office space existed at the three other business
locations and for whom the home office was essential.
Surely, Congress did not intend the statute to compel the selfemployed to rent office space. Instead, a self-employed
person's efficient use of his resources should be encouraged
by tax policy.I1O Justice Stevens concluded that a selfemployed taxpayer should qualify for the deduction when his
home office is ''the only place of his trade or business. "111
In response to the subjective comparison set forth in
Soliman, two commentators suggest careful planning in
order to qualify prospectively for the deduction. 1I2 A taxpayer can simply locate his office outside the home and avoid
the ugly Soliman comparison altogether or use a separate
structure on his residential property for his home office,
thereby falling into the separate structure exception. 113 These
suggestions, however, are financially impractical for those
taxpayers who are trying to decrease overhead expenses by
locating their offices in their homes. 114 The best strategy, the
commentators suggest, is for the taxpayer to design his
business to allow the taxpayer to meet patients, clients, and
customers at the taxpayer's home. In that way, the taxpayer
fits neatly into the meeting with clients exception and, again,
avoids Soliman altogether. 115
As a result of the Supreme Court decision in Soliman, it
is unclear whether the principal place of business debate will
continue. It is clear, however, that Congress is responsible
for any further clarification or definition.
The change mandated by Soliman is simple. The legislative history provides the necessary objective standards in
determining the allowance of a home office deduction. All
taxpayers, employees and non-employees, engage in the
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threshold inquiry. The first question is whether the use ofthe
home office is exclusive. If so, then the issue is whether the
home office is used on a regular basis. If the answer to the
second question is also yes, then the distinction between
employees and non-employees becomes relevant.
In the case of a taxpayer who is an employee, the only
remaining inquiry is whether the use of the portion of the
dwelling as a home office is for the convenience of the
employer. As long as the office is for the convenience of the
employer and not merely for personal convenience of the
employee, the deduction is allowable to the extent that the
expenses are ordinary and necessary in carrying on the
taxpayer's trade or business.
A taxpayer who is not an employee, i.e., an employer or
a self-employed person, must demonstrate that his home
office fits into one of the three specific exceptions. If the
taxpayer uses his home office to meet patients, clients, or
customers in the normal course of his trade or business, the
deduction is allowable. If the taxpayer has a separate
,structure used in the connection with his trade or business,
the deduction is allowed. Neither of these exceptions requires further analysis.
Finally, if this taxpayer does not fit into one of these two
exceptions, it is necessary to apply the principal place of
business exception. This is an arguably broader, if not
residual, exception intended to protect those taxpayers who
are self-employed and deserving of the benefit of the deduction but for whom it would be impractical to go to the expense
of constructing a separate structure. It also aids those
taxpayers whose business or trade does not involve meeting
clients at their home. Clearly, Congress intended to preserve
the home office deduction for this group oftaxpayers through
the principal place of business exception.
This result does not create the danger of excessive
deductions. The exclusivity and regular basis tests narrow
the availability of the deduction, and the expenses are still
limited to those that are ordinary and necessary. The
requirements of "exclusivity" and "regular basis" ensure
that the taxpayer spends a sufficient amount of time in his
home office. Further, to ensure the legitimacy ofthese home
offices which are claimed to be "principal," Congress could
further restrict the ability of the taxpayer to treat his home
office as his principal place of business by requiring, as
Justice Stevens suggested, that it be the only place ofhis trade
or business. The only true alternative office space to a
taxpayer in this position is that which the taxpayer would
have to undertake and individually lease. In this way, the
statute would never operate to compel a taxpayer to lease
office space merely to take a deduction of ordinary and
necessary business expenses, thereby promoting sound tax
policy by encouraging efficient use of the taxpayers's resources.
In an effort to substantially improve the fairness of the tax
system, Congress enacted § 280A as the objective and

definitive standard for the allowance of the home office
deduction. In doing so, Congress sought to curb excessive
claims by employees who found it personally convenient to
take work home. Congress did not intend to deny the benefit
which existed prior to 1976 for those self-employed taxpayers.
The recent interpretation by the Supreme Court of the
principal place of business exception clearly frustrates the
intent of Congress by setting forth a complex and subjective
standard which has the potential to deny tax equity to
similarly situated taxpayers rather than a definitive and
objective standard. The only remedy to this judicial malady
is legislative action. Until any such action takes place,
taxpayers must either creatively design their home offices to
comply with the statute in light of the Soliman decision or
take steps to avoid the statute altogether.
About the author:
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or deny them. Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors v. Commissioner,
630 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). (Unless otherwise indicated, all
references are to the Code as amended in 1986).
2See I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986). Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) (1954).
The statute provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred by the
taxpayer during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... " I.R.C. § 162(a). This section was primarily
intended to allow recovery for recurring expenditures where the
benefit derived from the payment is realized and exhausted
within the same taxable year. Stevens v. Commissioner, 388
F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968).
3See Newiv. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686(1969), aff'd,
432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
515 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 941 (1979); and Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820
(1973), rev 'd, 509F.2d679 (4thCir.1975),cert. denied,423 U.S.
825 (1975).
4I.R.C. § 280A (1986). Section 280A states in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule - Except as otherwise provided in this
section in the case of a taxpayer who is an individual or
an S corporation, no deduction otherwise allowable
under this chapter shall be allowed with respect to the
use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer
during the taxable year as a residence.
(c) Exceptions for certain business or rental use;
limitation on deduction for such use.(1) Certain business use.- Subsection (a) shall not
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apply to any item to the extent such item is allocable to
a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used
on a regular basis(A) [as] the principal place ofbusiness for
any trade or business of the taxpayer,
(B) as a place of business which is used by
patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing
with the taxpayer in the nonnal course of business, or
(C) in the case of a separate structure
which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business.
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall
apply only if the exclusive use referred to is for the
convenience of his employer.Id.
sTax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1569
(1976).
6U.S. Dep't ofTreas., Pub. No. 587, Business Use ofYour Home,
at 4-5. Landscaping and lawn care costs are expressly nondeductible expenses. Id.
71d. at 3. Also, the IRS suggests that if all the rooms in the home
are approximately the same size, then a taxpayer can simply
divide the total expenses by the total number of rooms in order to
calculate the deductible expenses. Id.
sId.at5. ThroughtheTaxReformActofl986,Congressclarified
what it meant by gross income. Gross income equals gross
revenues derived from the home office business minus the
"direct" expenses, e.g., secretarial, telephone, copy machine,
and facsimile expenses. For example, if a taxpayer has derived
$3,000 in gross revenues from his business in one taxable year and
has incurred $2,000 in direct expenses, his gross income is $1,000
and, therefore, his home office deduction is limited to $1,000 for
that taxable year. This prevents taxpayers from creating a net
business loss through the implementation of the home office
deduction. However, the Code does currently allow the taxpayer
to carry over the disallowed portion of the home office deduction
to the following taxable year. See Price Waterhouse, The Price
Waterhouse Guide to the New Tax Law 173-77 (1986).
9Jf.R Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 160 (1975),
reprinted in 1975 u.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3053. S. Rep. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3579.
1°I.RC. § 262 (1954). See also supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
III.RC. § 162(a)(1954). See also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
12Treas.Reg. § 1.262-1 (b) (3) (1992). The regulation states in full:
Expenses of maintaining a household, including amounts
paid for rent, water, utilities, domestic service, and the
like, are not deductible. A taxpayer who rents a property
for residential purposes, but incidentally conducts business there (his place of business being elsewhere) shall
not deduct any part of the rent. If, however, he uses part
of the house as his place of business, such portion of the
rent and other similar expenses as is properly attributable to such place ofbusiness is deductible as a business
expense. Id.
13H.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.
14H.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.

ISH.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.
16JI.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.
l7Rev. Rul. 62-180,1962-2 C.B. 52.
ISBlackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 255,256 (2d Cir. 1934).
See also Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir.
1970). Although the IRS complained that such a construction
"would open the doors for a business deduction to any employee
who would voluntarily choose to engage in an activity at home
which conceivably could be helpful to his employer's business.
.. ," the Second Circuit responded, "[t]his case opens the doors
just long enough to enable this [t]axpayer to pass through it into
his cloistered study to pursue his business." Newi, 432 F.2d at
1000.
19'fhe projected revenue effect of § 601 of the Tax Reform Act of
1976 was $207 million in 1977, increasing progressively by 1981
to $305 million in additional tax revenue. Section 601 enacted
several changes to the Code relating to business-related individual income tax deductions, including the home office deduction, for expenses attributable to homes, rental homes, or vacation
homes, etc. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 4.
20Ji.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 3.
21ld. at 157.
22H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 157. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 144 (emphasis added). See also I.R.C § 280A.
23H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.
24H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147-148. In support thereof, the House and Senate
reports accompanying the proposed legislation cite and discuss at
some length Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev 'd,
509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975). Bodzin, an attorney-advisor
employed by the Interpretive Division of the Office of Chief
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, claimed a business deduction
for the small office which he maintained in his apartment.
Although his employer provided him with an office close to home,
the taxpayer found it convenient to work at home in the evenings
and on the weekends. The Tax Court held that the statute did not
require a strict interpretation that the employer require that the
employee provide his own work facilities. Instead, the Tax Court
held that the applicable test for determining the appropriateness
of the deduction in an employee's residence is "whether ... the
maintenance of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful
under all circumstances." 60 T.C. at 825 (emphasis
added)(citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court decision concluding that the expenses incurred by the
taxpayer at home were personal expenses which were not deductible and, therefore, it followed that an inquiry into the "appropriateness" and "helpfulness" of those expenses was not necessary.
509 F.2d at 681. However, the court suggested that the outcome
of Bodzin might have been different if the taxpayer-employee
could have demonstrated that his office provided for him by
his employer was not available at all times or that his employer's
office was not suitable in light of the duties required of the
employee. ld.
2sH.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160. S. Rep. No. 938, supra
note 9, at 147.

26JI.R Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160-61.
and Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (19.84),
27id. at 161.
rev'd, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
28S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148. In addition to the two 36Section 280A (c)(I)(A) was amended in 1981. Thisamendment
exceptions proposed and later approved by Congress, the Senate substituted the current language of the statute, "the principal
amendment proposed three other allowable deductions for the place ofbusiness for any trade or business of the taxpayer" for "as
portion of a dwelling which is used exclusively and on a regular the taxpayer's principal place of business." Pub. L. No. 97-119,
basis (a) ifthe dwelling is the sole fixed location of the taxpayer's 95 Stat. 1642 (1981).
trade or business ofselling goods or services at retail or wholesale 3774 T.e. 105 (1973).
and is used in connection with the sale of goods or services, (b) 38id. at 109. (emphasis added). After a brief discussion of the
if a separate structure which is not attached to the dwelling unit legislative history of § 280A, the Tax Court posits, "Nothing in
is used in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, or (c) the legislative history of section 280A or the [c]ommissioner's
if the employer provides no office or fixed location for the use of regulations furnishes any guidance as to the scope of the 'princithe employee in the employer's trade or business (in connection pal place of business' concept in the context of § 280A. We
with such trade or business.) id. Why the Conference Committee therefore take it that what Congress had in mind was the focal
rejected the first and third exceptions proposed by the Senate is point of a taxpayer's activities ...." id. Without any support or
unclear.
authority, such a conclusion was clearly arbitrary. The focal point
29JI.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 435, does, however, provide an objective and workable standard for
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4118.
making the determination of whether a home office qualifies as
3O<'Exclusive use" means that a taxpayer must use a specific part
the principal place of business.
of his residence solely for the purpose of carrying on his trade or 39id. See also Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir.
business. Therefore, where that portion is used by the taxpayer 1986).
for personal purposes as well, the exclusivity test is not met. H.R. 4°Baie, 74 T.C. at 105-06, 109.
Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 41See cases cited supra note 35.
9, at 148 (emphasis added). Two exceptions to the "exclusivity"
42
79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
requirement are (1) less than exclusive storage ofinventory which 4379 T.C. at 609.
the taxpayer intends to sell at wholesale or retail and (2) a 44id. at 612 (citations omitted).
taxpayer who uses the home office as a day care facility. U.S. 45Id. at 613-14. Since the Met's business depended upon the
Dep't of Treas., supra note 6, at 3.
quality ofits performers, the retention of the taxpayer's job really
31That portion of the residence must be used by the taxpayer for depended upon his performance at the Met rehearsals and public
business purposes on a regular basis. Any incidental or occa- performances. !d. at 614.
sional business or trade use ofan exclusive portion ofthe dwelling 46Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67,69.
unit renders the deduction disallowed. H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra 47Id. at 69-70.
note 9, at 161. S. Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148-49.
48id. at 70 (quoting Sharon v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 515,523
321.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(A)-(C). See also supra note 5.
(1976».
331.R.C. § 280A(c)(I). H. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 161. S. 49id. at 69.
Rep. No. 938, supra note 9, at 148.
5°47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
34Rev. Rul. 62-180, supra note 17.
51 47 T.C.M. at 522. Although the professor was provided with
35See, e.g., Druckerv. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605 (1982), rev 'd, office space on campus, he was forced to share it with other
715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 faculty members and no typewriter was provided him. id.
T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); at 521.
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121d. at 523.
3
1d. at 522.
U. Chi. L. J. 277, 291 (1990).
4
11d. at 523.
791d. at 291. In place of the facts and circumstances test, the
"Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514 (citations
commentator proposes an objective two prong test. First, if the
omitted).
taxpayer
spends the majority of time at the home office, then the
6
' 1d. at 514-15.
7
taxpayer
takes
the deduction. Ifthe taxpayer spends less than the
' 1d. at 515. The portion of the House Report which the commismajority
of
his
time at the home office, then the court looks to the
sioner used to support his argument provides:
location
where
the "income generating" tasks are performed. If
[The] expenses otherwise considered nondeductible perthey
take
place
at
home, then the taxpayer can take the deduction.
sonal, living, and family expenses might be converted
If
the
taxpayer
simply
performs administrative duties at home
into deductible expenses simply because, under the facts
which
the
commentator
does not consider "income generating,"
of the particular case, it was appropriate and helpful to
then
the
taxpayer's
home
office would not qualify as a principal
perform some portion of the taxpayer's business in his
place
of
business.
Id.
at 292-95.
personal residence. For example, ifa university profes6
Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
sor, who is provided an office by his employer, uses a den
1
1d. at 54.
or some other room in his residence for the purpose of
82Id.
grading papers, preparing classroom notes, an allocable
11d. at 54-55 (citing Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45
portion of certain expenses might be claimed as a
Fed. Reg. 52,399 (as amended in 1983). The regulation states in
deduction even though only minor incremental expertinent part:
penses were incurred in order to perform these activities.
(3) Determinationofprincipalplace ofbusiness. When
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 658, supra note 9, at 160).
58
a taxpayer engages in a single trade or business at more
1d.at 515-16.
59
than one location, it is necessary to determine the
1d. at 515, 517. The court found great significance in the fact
taxpayer's principal place of business in light of all the
that the professor had to share his office with a fellow faculty
facts and circumstances. Among the facts and circummember, the office did not contain a typewriter, and the university
stances to be taken into account in making this determilibrary had limited hours of operation and was generally unsafe.
nation are the following:
Therefore, the home office was essential to the performance of the
(i) The portion of the total income from the business
duties required of this university professor. Id. at 513.
which
is attributable to activities at each location.
6049 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984), rev'd, 782 F.2d 78 (7th Cir.
(ii) The amount of time spent in activities related
1986).
to that business at each location; and
6149 T.C.M. at 137.
(iii) The facilities available to the taxpayer at each
62
1d. at 138.
location
63
for purposes of that business. Id.
Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 78, 79 (emphasis added)
81d. at 54.
(citing Weissman v. Commissioner,47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520(1983),
"Id.at 55. The only "purpose" to which the Fourth Circuit refers
rev 'd,751 F.2d 512, 514). See supranotes 55-56 and accompais the prevention of abuse of the deduction by taxpayers for
nying text.
expenses which are "appropriate and helpful." Id. at 53-54.
"Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79.
65
6Commissionerv. Soliman, -- U.S. --, 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992).
1d. (citations omitted).
10-U.S. --, 113 S.Ct. 701, 121 L.Ed.2d 634 (1993).
6.52 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (1986), afrd, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
81113 S.Ct. at 703-04.
1988).
"Id.at 705-06 (citingMalatv.Riddell, 383 U.S. 569,571 (1966)
6752 T.C.M. at 602.
(per
curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6
6
ld. at 600.
(1947))).
69
1d. at 602.
9°1d. at 706 (emphasis added).
70
Pomarantzv. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (1988).
91
1d. at 705.
71
1d. at 497-98. See also 52 T.C.M. at 602.
9Id.
at 706. Although this is quite reminiscent of the "focal
7294 T.C. 20 (1990).
point"
73
test, the Court cautioned that the "metaphorical quality"
1d. at 25.
of
the
phrase
74
can be misleading and that no one test is determi1d. The court explained: "Goods and services could be transnative in every case. The Court still regards the point of delivery
ferredto customers and clients at the taxpayer's home, the 'focal
as "an important indicator ofthe principal place ofbusiness." Id.
point,' only if the taxpayer meets clients or customers in his
91d. at 707.
94
home." Id.
1d.
751d.
at 707-08.
761d. Because Soliman rendered the majority of his services at the 91d.
96
1d.
three hospitals and those activities generated his income, under 97
1d. at 708.
the focal point test his principal place of business would be the
"Id.
hospitals, not his home office.
"Id.
771. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
°1d. at 709 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78
Kathleen Low, Soliman v. Commissioner: Recent Changes in
' ld. at 709-11 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
the Tax Court'sTreatmentofthe Home Office Deduction, 22 Loy.
'See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1

- U. Bait. L.F. / 24. 1

103 113 S.Ct. at 711 (Stevens, 1., dissenting).
104See supra note 9.
105
113 S.Ct. at 711 (Thomas & Scalia, 11., concurring).
106Jd. at 710 (Thomas & Scalia, J1., concurring).
107See supra note 92. See a/so supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
10BTaxpayer B is advised against taking the deduction because of
the similarity of this position to that of the taxpayer in Soliman.
Because his more important activities are perfonned at the
hospital and he spends less than a substantial amount of time at
his home office, the deduction, under Soliman, would be denied.
109
113 S.Ct. at 711 (Stevens, 1., dissenting).

II°Id. at 715.
'IIId.
IIlMichael M. Meggard & Susan L. Meggard, Supreme Court
Narrows Home Office Deduction in Soliman, 78 1. Tax'n 132
(1993).
I13Id. at 137.

114Id.
II sId. The authors, a lawyer and a professor of taxation and
accounting, respectively, evidence the worthlessness of Soliman
by implying that it is better to avoid Soliman then to face it head
on.
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